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NOTES
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT A LrTERAL
INTERPRETATION AS APPLIED TO PURELY INVESTIGATIVE FUNCTIONS

Introduction
The administrative agency appeared on the federal scene in 1887 as a governmental body exercising quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions.1 Because of
the constitutional doctrine of the separation of legislative and judicial functions,
constitutional questions of fair play arose and often prevented a real understanding
of the role of such agencies. After the turn of the century, the need for boards of
expert specialization in the general scheme of government regulation promoted the
widespread use of administrative agencies by the federal government. With this
development came the need for a somewhat simplified and standard procedure to
govern such agencies. In 1946, after more than ten years of consideration, Congress
passed the Administrative Procedure Act.2 This act was designed to meet this
need for a simple and standard plan of procedure for the functions of federal
administrative agencies.3
As the administrative concept has developed, two functions, adjudication and
rule-making, have traditionally been attributed to it.4 Adjudication is a quasijudicial activity; it usually applies to a named party; it looks backward to the
activities of the named party and determines his present legal position as a result.
It resembles the function of a court in deciding a case.5 On the other hand, rulemaking is a quasi-legislative function: it applies to unnamed parties; it looks to
the future applicability of its determination on indicated groups or persons; and
it resembles what a legislature does in enacting a statute.6 However, the administrative agency's role, as a board of expert specialization, is not fully carried out by
limiting agencies to quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial activity. The agency exists
as a repository of specialized knowledge which is relevant to the scheme of government regulation in general. It becomes a repository of specialized knowledge by
performing a third function, the agency investigation. The investigatory function
is designed to produce information.7 Of course, the investigative information may
be obtained for an adjudicative proceeding or for a rule-making proceeding and,
for such purposes, the investigation is a part of the adjudication or rule-making
process. But since the agency is a repository of specialized knowledge, the information from its investigations may be used for formulating general policy, for recommending legislation to Congress, or for illuminating obscure areas in order to supply
such information either to the public or to an external body as needed or requested.
Investigations for these purposes are investigations for the sake of investigation,
and these constitute the third, separate and distinct function of an administrative
agency.8
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S. Doe. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 241-2 (1946).
1 DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 1 (1958).
Id. at 286-7.

6 Ibid.
7 Id. at 159-160.

8 Hereafter, these investigations solely for the purpose of gathering information will be
referred to as purely investigatory functions.
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Under the APA, Congress has provided an informal procedure for rule-making9
and a much more formal procedure for adjudication. 10 The APA provides no
procedure for the purely investigatory function of an agency. Of course, those
investigations for rule-making and adjudication will be governed under the act by
the procedures for rule-making and adjudication respectively. But what of the
investigations purely for the purpose of gathering information? Does Congress in
the APA subject such purely investigatory functions to the informal procedure for
rule-making, to the more formal procedure for adjudication, or to neither?
A problem arises under the APA in relation to these purely investigatory
functions because the definitions in the act, if taken literally, classify all administrative activities as either rule-making or adjudication. If the purely investigatory
functions do not come under the rule-making definition and the informal procedure
required for it, they ostensibly come under the definition of adjudication and the
more formal procedure required therefor in the APA. 11 Some authors suggest
that these non-adjudicative, non-rule-making investigations need not come under
either definition in the act, and hence are not covered by the act.' 2 The latter view
points up the problem. An agency gathering specialized information, not for its
own use but as a repository of expert knowledge for the public in general and for
external bodies, should not be hampered by the imposition of formal procedure.
The latter view recognizes this and reaches the conclusion that such purely investigatory functions cannot come under the APA. It may be true that they should
not come under the APA, but has the APA itself excepted them to the extent that
they remain purely investigatory?
This problem has become especially acute when viewed in the perspective of
the recent three-judge federal court decision in Louisiana in the case of Larche v.
3
The court issued a permanent injunction restraining the Civil Rights
Hannah.1
Commission from carrying on its investigations in Louisiana unless it gives accused
witnesses, subpenaed to testify before it, the "traditional rights" of confrontation and
cross-examination.' 4 Of interest is the court's determination that the Civil Rights
Commission in its investigations, because they are non-adjudicative and non-rulemaking, is not required to follow the formal adjudication procedure set out in the
APA.' 5 The court implicitly recognizes the purely investigatory function, which
should not be subjected to a formal procedure, but then goes on to require the
commission to provide some of the traditional safeguards which are required in
a formal judicial procedure and which would be required under the adjudication
procedure in the APA. 6 Should not the very reason for the court exempting the
investigations from the formal procedure of the APA, if correctly arrived at by
the court, except it from the due process argument of the court?
9 The informal procedure provided for rule-making in section 4 of the APA (60 Stat. 238
(1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1003(a), (b) (1958)) requires general notice of the proposed rule-making
to be published in the Federal Register, and any interested party must be given opportunity to
participate in the rule-making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with
or without opportunity to present the same orally in any manner.
10 The formal procedure for adjudication in sections 5 through 8 of the APA (60 Stat.
241 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004-7 (1958)) provides who the hearing officers will be; the subpena and testimony powers of the presiding officers; the rules of evidence including crossexamination; the type of record to be kept; the hierarchy of action by subordinates in an
agency; and the decisional process in general.
11 See APA, § 2 (c), (d), 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.O.§ 1001 (c), (d) (1958). See also
Blachly & Oatman, The FederalAdministrativeProcedureAct, 34 GEo. L. J. 407, 417 (1946).
12 See, e.g., 1 DAvis, op. cit. supra note 4, at 159, n.l.
13 Civil No. 7479, W. D. La., Oct. 7, 1959.

14 Id. at 11 (mimeo.).

15 Id. at 2, n. 3.
16 APA § 7 (c), 60 Stat. 241 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1006 (c) (1958). "(c) EVIDEN E ...
Every party shall have the right to present his case or defense by oral or documentary evidence,
to submit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such cross-examination as may be required for a
full and true disclosure of the facts."

NOTES
The approach of this Note to the problem of APA coverage of the purely
investigatory functions of agencies will be to examine ten typical federal administrative agencies and determine whether their non-adjudicative, non-rule-making investigations logically fall under the adjudication procedure required by the APA.
The agencies chosen 1 7 are administrative groups which meet the definition of an
"agency" in Section 2(a) of the APA.' s
I.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT

In substance, the APA requires all federal agencies to publish certain information in the Federal Register as to their own procedure and make public other administrative materials.' 9 It states the essentials of the informal rule-making procedure and
the essentials of the formal procedure required for adjudication. 20 It prescribes
limitations on sanctions and licensing procedures, 2 ' and sets forth a simplified statement of judicial review designed to afford a remedy for every legal wrong. 22 Since
Congress passed this bill with the expressed intent that it "be operative 'across the
board' in accordance with its terms, or not at all, ' 2 the problem of whether the
adjudicative process is applicable to an agency's non-adjudicative, non-rule-making
investigations is circumscribed by the terms and definitions of the act. Section 2(d)
defines an order, which is formulated by the agency process of adjudication, as:
"the whole or any part of the final disposition (whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form) of any agency in any matter other than rule
making but including licensing." 24 As is plain from the language, order and its corresponding term adjudication are residual definitions. Thus, agency activities which
don't come within the definition of rule and rule-making are encompassed by the
definitions of order and adjudication. This residual phenomenon is important,
because: first, it appears to include all of those purely investigatory functions which
are non-adjudicative as well as non-legislative; and second, the definition of a rule,
as the House Report emphasizes, determines whether the fairly informal procedure
of section 4 applies rather than the more formal procedure of Sections 5, 7, and
8.25 The act defines "rule!' as:
. .. the whole or any part of any agency statement of general or particular
applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe
law or policy or to describe the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of any agency and includes the approval or prescription for the future of rates, wages, corporate or financial structures or reorganizations

thereof, prices, facilities, appliances, services or allowances therefor or of
valuations, costs, or accounting, or practices bearing upon any of the fore17 Eight of these agencies are regulatory ones, and two are distinct, solely investigative
bodies.
18 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1958).
As used in this Act . . . 'Agency' means each authority (whether or not

within or subject to review by another agency) of the Government of the
United States other than Congress, the courts, or the governments of the
possessions, Territories, or the District of Columbia. Nothing in this Act
shall be construed to repeal delegations of authority as provided by law.
Except as to the requirements of section 3, there shall be excluded from the
operation of this Act (1) agencies composed of representatives of the parties
or of representatives of organizations of the parties to the disputes determined by them, (2) courts martial and military commissions, (3) military
or naval authority exercised in the field in time of war or in occupied
territory, or (4) functions which by law expire on the termination of present
hostilities, within any fixed period thereafter, or before July 1, 1947, and
the functions conferred by the following statutes ....
19 60 Stat. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1958).
20 See notes 9 & 10, supra.
21 APA § 9, 60 Stat. 242 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1008 (1958).
22 APA § 10, 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1958).
23 S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 250 (1946).
24 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (d) (1958).
25 S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 23, at 254.
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agency process for the formulation, amendgoing. "Rule making" means
28
ment, or repeal of a rule.

As can be easily seen, this definition of rule includes not only those quasi-legislative
functions of future effect and applicability to unnamed parties, but a wide miscellany
of administrative actions such as the implementation and interpretation of law,
prescription of law or policy, and descriptions of the organization, procedure and
practice requirements of any agency.2 7 The definition also includes statements by
the agency of particular applicability, but this means only that what is otherwise
merely because it applies only to parrule-making does not become adjudication
2
ticular parties or to a particular situation.
One basic rule of construction in determining whether a particular agency's
purely investigative functions come under the APA's definition of rule or order
"is to determine whether it falls within the more affirmative and specific definition
of 'rule' in Section 2(c), if not, it is 'adjudication.' "29 But the specific enumeration of activities included in the definition of rule is not intended to be exhaustive.30
Some authors suggest that the process of classifying any agency function should not
be limited to the strict construction described above, but be bound only by the more
functional distinction between rule-making and adjudication.3 1 This would be a
rational construction, except as applied to the investigations considered in this
Note, which are not easily classified as either quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial
activities. In reality, this puts us back with the strict construction of the definitions
and the resulting residual phenomenon. Davis, in his Treatise on Administrative
Law suggests that
the way to solve problems of classifying activities which analytically fall into

more than one category or into no category is to keep an eye on producing
a good practical result in the particular case.... The ideas of both courts
and agencies about the desirability or undesirability of applying the requirements of Section
5 to a particular proceeding should assist the classification
32

in each case.
This solution to the classification problem is worthy of discussion because it seems
there is no practical reason for insisting upon adjudicatory procedure in a pure
investigation. The House Report on the APA sees the definitions as closely tied
in with the procedures under sections 4, 5, 7, and 8.3
Section 4 of the APA prescribes the procedure for rule-making. The introduction to the section lists two exceptions to its provisions:
Except to the extent that there is involved (1) any military, naval, or foreign affairs functions of the United States or (2) any matter relating to
agency management or personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts .... 3
The second exception automatically removes from the prescribed rule-making
procedure those regulations of a particular agency by which its functions are
channeled and determined. 5 In other words, the definition of rule includes these
regulations but the exceptions in section 4 distinguish between regulations controlling the agency which are not subject to the procedure, and those affecting other
parties. Section 4 also makes another distinction: "Where rules are required by
26
27

28
29
REV.
30
31
32

60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001(c) (1958).
Blachly & Oatman, supra note 11, at 409.
1 DAvIs, op. cit. supra note 4, at 296. S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 23, at 197.
Ginnane, Rule Making, Adjudication, and Exemptions Under the A.P.A., 95 U. PA. L.
621, 623 (1947).
See S. Doe. No. 248, supra note 23, at 197 & 254.
See, e.g., Ginnane, supra note 29, at 624.
1 DAVIs, op. cit. supra note 4, at 298.

33 S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 23, at 251. "The definitions in section 2 are important,
but they do not indicate the scope of the bill since the subsequent provisions make many functional distinctions and exceptions."
34 60 Stat. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1003 (1958).
35 However, under section 3(a) (2) of the APA these regulations of the particular agency
must still be published in the Federal Register. 60 Stat. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1958).

NOTES
statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing, the
requirements of sections 7 and 8 shall apply in the place of the provisions of this
subsection." 36 Thus many quasi-legislative results involving rates, facilities, appliances, services, valuations, etc., which are defined as rules in section 2(c) become,
because a hearing and a record are required by statute, the subject of an "order"
under the adjudicative process of sections 7 and 8. In relation to the problem of
this Note, this exception further complicates the problem, since an investigative
function may literally come under the terms of the definitions of "rule" and "rulemaking," but not escape the formal adjudicative process because the statute may
require a hearing and a record.
Coverage under section 5 subjects the proceeding to the procedural requirements of sections 7 and 8. But again section 5, by means of an introductory clause,
removes many functions defined as adjudication from the rigors of the formal
procedure required for it:
In every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined on the
record after opportunity for an agency hearing, except to the extent that
there is involved (1) any matter subject to a subsequent trial of the law
and the facts de novo in any court; (2) the selection or tenure of an officer or employee of the United States other than examiners appointed pursuant to section 11; (3) proceedings in which decisions rest solely on inspections, tests, or elections; (4) the conduct of military, naval, or foreign
affairs functions; (5) cases in which an agency is acting as an agent for a
37
court; and (6) the certification of employee representatives ....

It seems evident that Congress has, by the exception clauses in sections 4 and 5,
provided for the elimination of many of the activities of an administrative agency,
such as purely investigative functions, which, unless within the specific terms of
the definition of rule, seem to fall into the residual definition of an order. Since
Congress has attempted to closely connect definitions with the procedures, it would
be best to determine if the particular investigation falls within the terms of the
definition of rule. If it does, then the exceptions in section 4 seem applicable. If
it does not, then it will fall under the residual definition of an order, and the exceptions in section 5 can be applied.
II. FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
A. Regulatory Agencies
(1) The Interstate Commerce Commission
The Interstate Commerce Commission was created in 1887 by the Interstate Commerce Act, which was the first attempt by Congress to effect any regulation through an agency exercising quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers.38
Initially, the ICC regulated only railroad carriers engaged in interstate commerce.
Today, the ICC also regulates motor carriers,3 9 water carriers, 40 and freight forwarders. 41 Under the general empowering sections of the Act in relation to freight
forwarders, 42 water carriers, 43 and railroad carriers,
36 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (1958).
37 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004 (1958). In explaining the various sections of
the APA, the Senate Judiciary Committee pointed out that the introductory clause of section 5
removes from the operation of sections 5, 7 and 8 all administrative procedures in which Congress has not required orders to be made upon a
Limiting application of the sections to these cases in which
hearing ....
statutes require a hearing is particularly significant, because thereby are
excluded the great mass of administrative routine as well as pensions,
claims, and a variety of similar matters in which Congress has usually intentionally or traditionally refrained from requiring an administrative hearing.
S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 23, at 21.
38 BAR Ass'N OF DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, op. cit. supra note 1, at 102.
39 49 Stat. 543 (1935), 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-27 (1952).
40 54 Stat. 929 (1940), 49 U.SC. §§ 901-23 (1952).
41 56 Stat. 284 (1942), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1022 (1952).
42 56 Stat. 286 (1942), 49 U.S.C. § 1003(e) (1952).
43 54 Stat. 933 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 904(b) (1952).
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the Commission shall have authority, in order to perform the duties and
carry out the objects for which it was created, to inquire into and report on
the management of the business of all common carriers subject to the provisions of this chapter, and to inquire into and report on the management
of the business of persons controlling, controlled by, or under a common
control with such carriers.... The Commission . . . may transmit to Congress from time to time such recommendations (including recommendations
44
as to additional legislation) as the Commission may deem necessary.

This type of investigation, where the ICC may turn the facts over to Congress
or may use them in rule-making or adjudication under other sections of the statute
is not the type of investigation with which this Note is primarily concerned. If
this section only empowered the ICC to gather the facts about the management
of the business of common carriers and turn them over to Congress, its function would
be the non-adjudicative, non-rule-making type of investigation with which we
are concerned. Another example of this same type of investigation, which is not
exactly an investigation for the sake of investigation, is found in Section 19a of the
Interstate Commerce Act where the ICC is given power to investigate and evaluate
the property of common carriers, and to report on the investigations to Congress.
But, such final valuations by the ICC after the carrier has had a chance to protest
"shall be published and shall be prima facie evidence of the value of the property
in all proceedings under this chapter . . . and in all judicial proceedings for the
enforcement of this chapter. ' 45 Such a valuation-investigation by the ICC is an
investigation resulting in adjudication if the ICC uses it later to enforce the
act.48 Therefore, this type of investigation is not within the purview of this Note
since its aim is not just investigation for the sake of investigation but it is spe47
cifically for use by the ICC itself indirectly enforcing the other provisions of the act.
In relation to these valuations, the ICC does make investigations and valiations
of common carriers subject to the Federal Communications Act when requested to
do so by the Federal Communications Commission; and, it transfers all records
of the investigations and resulting valuation to the Federal Communications Commission. 48 These investigations of the ICC are non-adjudicative, non-rule-making
investigations as far as the ICC is concerned, although the Federal Communications Commission may use them for adjudication or rule-making. As far as the
APA definitions of rule and order are concerned, these valuation-investigations fall
under the more specific terms in the definition of a rule.4" Of course, if the rule
- the valuation - is required to be made on record after opportunity for an
agency hearing, the adjudicative procedure of sections 7 and 8 of the Administrative Procedure Act will still apply.50 In section 213 (a) of the Federal Communications Act, the Federal Communications Commission may make the valuation
itself after opportunity for hearing; so in section 2 13 (g) where the ICC shall make
such valuations, if requested to do so, it is quite probable that the ICC will be
bound to make its valuations after opportunity for an agency hearing in the same
way as the Federal Communications Commission. Also, in section 213(g) the ICC
must turn over the record relating to the valuation. So from the terms of this
section, the ICC, in performing these investigations for the Federal Communications
Commission, should come under the adjudicative procedure of sections 7 and 8

44 54 Stat. 910 (1948), 49 U.S.C. § 12 (1952).
45 49 Stat. 543 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 19(a) (1952).
46 See Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 130 (1939).
47 Almost every agency considered in this Note has such general investigative powers, but
such investigations are not pertinent in this Note. No further reference will be made to them.
48 48 Stat. 1074 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 213(g) (1952).
49 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001(c) (1958). "Rule means . . . any agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect .. .and includes the approval or
prescription for the future of ... valuations ....
50 60 Stat. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (1958).
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of the APA. This would be in line with what the Federal Communications Commission requires by its own regulations in making the valuations."'
Under section 226 of the Interstate Commerce Act, the IC is authorized
to investigate and report on the need for Federal regulation of the sizes and
weight of motor vehicles and combinations of motor vehicles and of the
qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees of all motor car52
riers and private carriers of property by motor vehicle ....
The ICC has laid down no special regulations in regard to these investigations.

The results of this function do not fall under any of the specific or general terms in
the definition of a rule in the APA. So, under the residual definition of an order
in the Administrative Procedure Act, this function would be subjected to the
formal adjudication procedures of sections 5, 7 and 8, unless it comes under one
of the exceptions in the introductory clause of section 5. Exception three, "proceedings in which the decisions rest solely on inspections, tests, or elections," seems
applicable to this function of the ICG since its report to Congress will depend upon
inspections of motor carriers. Also, this investigation by the IG would come
under the congressional reason for the exception of these functions from the
adjudicative procedure - that is, "because
53 those methods of determination do
not lend themselves to the hearing process."
Another non-adjudicative, non-rule-making investigation of the ICG is found
in the directive
...to investigate and report on the use of and necessity for block-signal
systems and appliances for the automatic control of railway trains in the
United States.... In transmitting its report to the Congress the Commission shall recommend such legislation as to the Commission seems advisable.
To carry out and give effect to the provisions of this section the Commission shall have power to issue subpenas, administer oaths.... 54

As such, the terms in the definition of a "rule" and "rule making" in the APA
do not include this function of the ICC. This investigative function would logically
fall under the residual definition of section 2(d) and hence require the formal
procedure of section 5 of the APA. But this investigation and the resulting recommendations to Congress are not required by statute to be determined on the record
after opportunity for an agency hearing. Even though this section does give the
IG the power to subpena witnesses, the IG may investigate without the hearings.
Therefore, in this purely investigatory function, the ICC should not be under the
adjudication procedure of the APA even though the investigation falls under the
definition of adjudication in the APA.
Another purely investigative function of the ICC is its investigation of
...all collisions, derailments, or other accidents in serious injury to person or to property of a railroad occurring on the line of 55any common
carrier engaged in interstate or foreign commerce by railroad.

Under this section, the Commission can subpena witnesses, etc. It must cooperate
with state commissions making such investigations, and the ICC can, when it deems
it in the public interest, make public reports of such accidents. This investigative
function is ostensibly not under the illustrative terms in the definition of rule in
the Administrative Procedure Act, so it is logically under section 5. But the lack
of a requirement of a record or a hearing removes it from the adjudication procedure of the APA. However, even if this section authorizing these investigations
were construed to require a hearing and a record, it still would be excepted from
section 5 by the first exception in in the introductory clause - "any matter subject

51
52
53
54
55
56

"47 C.F.R. §
54 Stat. 929
S. Doc. No.
34 Stat. 838
Ibid.
36 Stat. 351

1.214 (1958).
(1940), 49 U.S.C. § 325 (1952).
248, supra note 23, at 260-61.
(1906), 45 U.S.C. § 35 (1952).
(1910), 45 U.S.C. § 40 (1952).
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84

to a subsequent trial of the law and the facts de novo in any court."5's Section 4 of
the Interstate Commerce Act which provides
That neither said report nor any report of said investigation nor any
part thereof shall be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose in any
growing out of any matter mentioned in said
suit or action for damages
58
report or investigation.
...

supports this interpretation.
These examples of the non-adjudicative, non-rule-making investigations of

the ICC show that it is generally true that these investigations do not come under
the adjudicative procedure set up by the Administrative Procedure Act even though
such investigations come under the residual definition of adjudication.
(2) The Federal Trade Commission
The Federal Trade Commission was created by an act of Congress in 1914.59
In addition to its general investigative functions in matters leading to adjudication
or rule-making, the FTC was also given a number of additional investigatory functions in section 6 of the act.
(a) To gather and compile information concerning and to investigate from time
to time the organization, business, conduct, practices, and management of
any corporation engaged in commerce, excepting banks and common carriers subject to the Act to regulate commerce, and its relation to other corporations and to individuals, associations, and partnerships....
(c) Whenever a final decree has been entered against any defendant corporation in any suit brought by the United States to prevent and restrain any
violation of the antitrust Acts, to make investigation, upon its own initiative,
of the manner in which the decree has been or is being carried out, and
upon the application of the Attorney General it shall be its duty to make
such investigation....
(d) Upon the direction of the President or either House of Congress to investigate and report the facts relating to any alleged violations of the antitrust
Acts by any corporation.
(e) Upon the application of the Attorney General to investigate and make recommendations for the readjustment of the business of any corporation alleged to be violating the antitrust Acts in order that the corporation may
thereafter maintain its organization, management, and conduct of business in
accordance with the law.
(h) To investigate, from time to time, trade conditions in and with foreign countries where associations, combinations, or practices of manufacturers, merchants, or traders, or other conditions, may affect the foreign trade of the
to Congress thereon, with such recommendaUnited States, and to report
60
tions as it deems advisable.

No matter which definition in the APA these investigations are governed by, presumably none are subjected to the formal adjudicative procedure of the APA. The
reason is that none of these functions is required by statute to be determined on
the record after opportunity for an agency hearing. The rules regulating these
investigations are set out in detail by the FTC.6 1 In these regulations, the FTC
emphasizes voluntary cooperation on the part of those subject to the particular
investigation,' and points out that investigational hearings, as distinguished from
hearings in adjudicative proceedings, may be conducted in the course of an investigation under section 6.63 Therefore, no opportunity for a formal agency hearing
is required by this statute.
Under the Defense Production Acts Amendments of 1952, the FTC is em57 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. 1004 (1952). "In every case of adjudication required
by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing, except to
the extent that there is involved (1) any matter subject to a subsequent trial of the law and
the facts de novo in any court ..
58 36 Stat. 351 (1910), 45 U.S.C. § 41 (1952).

59
60
61
62
63

38
38
16
16
16

Stat. 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1958).
Stat. 721 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 46(a), (c), (d), (e), (h) (1958).
C.F.R. §§ 1.3-1.42 (Supp. 1959).
'C.F.R. § 1.31 (Supp. 1959).
C.F.R. § 1.34 (Supp. 1959).
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powered to make investigations for the Attorney General who turns reports over
to the President and Congress periodically.
The President is authorized to consult with representatives of industry, business, financing, agriculture, labor, and other interests, with a view to enby such persons with the approval by the President of
the making and
couraging
voluntary agreements
programs to further the objectives of this Act....
(e) The Attorney General is directed to make, or request the Federal
Trade Commission to make for him, surveys for the purpose of determining any factors which may tend to eliminate competition, create or
strengthen monopolies, injure small business, or otherwise promote un-

due concentration of economic power in the course of the administration of this Act. Such surveys, and the reports hereafter required,
shall include studies of the voluntary agreements and programs authorized by this section ....

4

Although this is a non-adjudicative, non-rule-making investigation of the FTC, it
is by statute specifically excluded from the operation of the Administrative Procedure Act except as to the requirements of section 3. 65 Here, Congress has demonstrated conclusively that it does not want these investigations subject to any of
the more formal procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act.
(3) The Federal Power Commission
In 1920, under the Federal Water Power Act, the Federal Power Commission
was established.6 6 Today this Commission regulates development of water power
and resources,67 electric utility companies engaged in interstate commerce, 68 and
natural gas companies. 69 Under those sections of the statute relating to the FPC's
regulation of electric utility companies, the Commission has two purely investigatory
functions. First, the FPG
. .. upon its own motion, or upon the request of any State commission
whenever it can do so without prejudice to the efficient and proper conduct
of its affairs, may investigate and determine the cost of the production or
transmission of electric energy by means of facilities under the jurisdiction
has no authority to esof the Commission in cases where the Commission
tablish a rate governing the sale of such energy.70

This type of investigation, although the FPC has no authority to implement it in
the future, could be interpreted as coming under the illustrative terms in the definition of "rule" in the APA. 1 But the statute does not in terms require the investigation to be on record after an opportunity for an agency hearing, so the investigations will not come under the formal procedure for adjudication.
In addition, the FPC may conduct investigations under the Federal Power Act
to secure information
. . . regarding the generation, transmission, distribution, and sale of electrical energy, however produced, throughout the United States and its possessions, whether or not otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the Commisthe results of the invession.... The Commission shall report to Congress
2

tigations made under authority of this section.

This investigation is not under the adjudication procedure of the Administrative
Procedure Act because again the statute does not require the investigations and
resulting recommendations to be made on record after an opportunity for an
64 64 Stat. 818 (1952), as amended 69 Stat. 581 (1955), 50 U.S.C. App. § 2158 (Supp. V,
1958).
65 64 Stat. 819 (1950), 50 U.S.C. App. § 2159 (1952). "The functions exercised under
this Act shall be excluded from the operation of the Administrative Procedure Act (60 Stat.
237) except as to the requirements of section 3 thereof...
66 41 Stat. 1063 (1920), 16 U.S.C. § 792 (1958).
67 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-823 (1958).
68 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 824-825r (1958).
69 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1958).
70 49 Stat. 852 (1935), 16 U.S.C. § 824e(b) (1958).
71 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001(c) (1958). "Rule means ... any agency statement of ... particular applicability and future effect.., and includes approval or prescription
for the future of costs ....

72

"

49 Stat. 859 (1935), 16 U.S.C. § 825j (1958).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
agency hearing. This is solely an investigation resulting in a report to Congress.
Under the 1938 Natural Gas Act,7 the FPC has two non-adjudicative, nonrule-making investigative functions. The first one is identical with the first investigative function under the Federal Power Act discussed above. 74 The same reasons
for its exemption from the formal adjudication procedure given above apply here.
The other non-adjudicative, non-rule-making investigation required of the
FPC by the Natural Gas Act is:
(a) In case two or more States propose to Congress compacts dealing with the
conservation, production, transportation, or distribution of natural gas it
shall be the duty of the Commission to assemble pertinent information
relative to the matters covered in any such proposed compact, to make public and to report to the Congress information so obtained, together with
such recommendations for further legislation as may appear to be appropriate or necessary to carry out the purposes of such proposed compact and
to aid in the conservation of natural gas resources within the United States
and economic production, transportation, and
and in the orderly, equitable,
75
distribution of natural gas.

Again this function is in all essentials similar to the second investigative function
of the FPC under the Federal Power Act, discussed above. It cannot logically
come under the adjudication procedure of the Administrative Procedure Act because no opportunity for an agency hearing is required by this statute. Subsection
(c) of this section of the Natural Gas Act supports this conclusion because the
FPC is directed to gather much7 6 of its material from files and records of other
government agencies and bureaus.
(4) The Securities and Exchange Commission
The Securities and Exchange Commission was established in 1934 by the
Securities Exchange Act. 7 Since then its power, functions, and independence have
become quite pronounced under later acts, such as the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935.71 Under the latter act, the SEC has two non-adjudicative,
non-rule-making investigative functions. First,
The Commission, in order to obtain information to serve as a basis for recommending further legislation, shall from time to time conduct investigations regarding the making, performance, and costs of service, sales, and
construction contracts with holding companies and subsidiary companies
thereof and with public-utility companies, the economies resulting therefrom, and the desirability thereof. The Commission shall report to Congress, from time to time, the results of such investigations, together with
such recommendations for legislation as it deems advisable. . . . Such recommendations shall be made available to State commissions, public utility
companies, and to the public .... 79

Second,
The Commission is authorized and directed to make studies and investigations of public utility companies, the territories served or which can be
served by public utility companies, and the manner in which the same are
or can be served, to determine the sizes, types, and locations of public utility

companies which do or can operate most economically and efficiently in the
public interest, in the interest of investors and consumers, and in the furtherance of a wider and more economical use of gas and electric energy;
73
74

75
76
77
78
79

52 Stat. 821 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1958).
52 Stat. 823 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717d(b) (1948).
The Commission upon its own motion, or upon the request of any
(b)
State commission, whenever it can do so without prejudice to the efficient
and proper conduct of its affairs, may investigate and determine the cost
of the production or transportation of natural gas by a natural-gas company in cases where the Commission has no authority to establish a rate governing the transportation or sale of such natural gas.
52 Stat. 827 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717j(a) (1958)
52 Stat. 827 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717j(c) (1958).
48 Stat. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1958).
49 Stat. 838 (1935), 15 U.S:C. § 79 (1958).
49 Stat. 825 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79m(g) (1958).
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upon the basis of such investigations and studies the Commission shall make
public from time to time its recommendations .... 80
Neither of these investigative functions comes within the terms in the definition of
rule-making, and neither logically comes under the adjudicative procedure of the
Administrative Procedure Act because neither section requires an opportunity for
an agency hearing.
In the regulations of the SEC, it is explicitly stated that its general practices
and procedures for public hearings and proceedings
...shall not be applicable to investigations conducted by the Commission
pursuant to ... sections . . . 13g ... and 30 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935..
.
(5) The Federal Communications Commission
The last of the older, tested agencies considered in this note is the Federal
Communications Commission which was established by the Communications Act
of 1934.82 Two sections of this statute give the FCC four types of purely investigatory functions. Section 215 of the act provides three of the four types of nonadjudicative, non-rule- aking investigations.
(a) The Commission shall examine into transactions entered into by any common carrier which relate to the furnishing of equipment, supplies, research,
services, finances, credit, or personnel to such carrier and/or which may
affect the charges made or to be made and/or the services rendered or to
be rendered by such carrier, in wire or radio communication subject to this
chapter, and shall report to the Congress.... The Commission shall include in its report its recommendations for necessary legislation in connection with such transactions, and shall report specifically whether in its opinion legislation should be enacted....
(b) The Commission shall investigate the methods by which and the extent to
which wire telephone companies are furnishing wire telegraph service and
wire telegraph companies are furnishing wire telephone service, and shall report its findings to Congress, together with its recommendations as to
whether additional legislation on this subject is desirable.
(c) The Commission shall examine all contracts of common carriers subject to
this chapter which prevent the other party thereto from dealing with another common carrier subject to this chapter, and shall report its findings
to 'Congress .... 83
Neither this section nor any other section of this statute requires in these particular
investigations that the FCC provide an opportunity for an agency hearing. From
the wording of subsection (a), Congress evidently intended that the FCC in this
investigation would acquire much of its information from records, books, etc., which
wouldn't necessarily require any hearing. Therefore, the adjudication procedure of
the APA will not apply to these investigations of the FCC.
Section 220 of the Communications Act of 1934 is concerned with the regulation, by the FCC, of accounts, records and memoranda kept by the carriers subject
to the Act. 4 In section 220(j), the FCC is authorized to investigate and report
to Congress
... as to the need for legislation to define further or harmonize the powers
of the Commission and of State commissions with respect to which this section relates.65
First, this investigative function does not come under the definition of a rule and
rule-making in the APA, so it logically would fall under the residual definition of
an order. But the adjudicative procedure of sections 5, 7 and 8 of the APA does
not apply because again the statute does not require an opportunity for an agency
hearing. Therefore, this purely investigatory function of the FCC does not come
under either procedure of the Administrative Procedure Act.
80
81
82
83
84
85

49
17
48
48
48
48

Stat. 837 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79z-4 (1958).
C.F.R. § 201.20 (1949).
Stat. 1064 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1952).
Stat. 1076 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 215 (1952).
Stat. 1078 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 220 (1952).
Stat. 1078 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 220(j) (1952).
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These investigations under sections 220(j) and 215 of the Communications
Act again -point up the statement in the House Report on the Administrative Procedure Act that the functional distinctions between procedures are not made just
in the definitions in the act but also in the exceptions in the other sections of
the Administrative Procedure Act."" The investigation required by section 220(j)
would allow informality, especially since the FCC will be dealing with the state
commissions.
(6) The Immigration and Naturalization Service
In 1940, the Immigration and Naturalization Service which prior to this time
was under the Department of Labor, was reestablished in the Department of
Justice.8T The Service is actually one of the "arms" of the Attorney General,
especially in the field of immigration and naturalization. By statute, the Attorney
General is given power to delegate many functions to the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, who is in full charge of the INS. 88 By the regulations
of the INS, the Commissioner has been delegated the full authority of the Attorney
General "to direct the administration of the Service and to enforce the act and all
other laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens." ' Under the
Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952, the INS is given authority to examine
and investigate a petitioner for naturalization and then to make recommendations
to a naturalization court.9 0 This is a non-adjudicative, non-rule-making investigation on the part of the INS. The results of these investigative functions do not come
under the definition of a rule in the Administrative Procedure Act, so they fall
under the residual definition of order and therefore under sections 5, 7 and 8 of
86
87
88
89

90

S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 23, at 251.
54 Stat. 1238 (1940), 5 U.S.C. § 342 (1952).
66 Stat. 173 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (a), (b) (1952).
8 C.F.R. § 2.1 (Supp. 1958).
Without divesting the Attorney General of any of his powers, privileges,
or duties under the immigration and naturalization laws, and except as to
the Board, there is delegated to the Commissioner the authority of the Attorney General to direct the administration of the Service and to enforce the
act and all other laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of
aliens. The Commissioner may issue regulations as deemed necessary or appropriate for the exercise of any authority delegated to him by the Attorney
General; and may redelegate any such authority to any other officer or
employee of the Service.
66 Stat. 255 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1446(a), (b), (d) (1958).
(a)
At any time prior to the holding of the final hearing on a petition
for naturalization provided for by section 336(a) of this title, an employee
of the Service, or of the United States designated by the Attorney General,
shall conduct a personal investigation of the person petitioning for naturalization in the vicinity or vicinities in which such person has maintained his
actual place of abode and in the vicinity or vicinities in which such person
'has been employed or has engaged in business or work for at least ....
(b) The Attorney General shall designate employees of the Service to conduct preliminary examinations upon petitions for naturalization to any naturalization court and to make recommendations thereon to such court. For
such purposes any such employee so designated is authorized to take testimony concerning any matter touching or in any . . . to administer oaths,
. . . and to require by subpena ...
. The record of the preliminary examination authorized by this subsection shall be admissible as evidence in any
final hearing conducted by a naturalization court .... (d) The recommendation of the employee designated to conduct any such preliminary examination shall be submitted to the court at the hearing upon the petition and
shall include a recommendation that the petition be granted, or denied,
or continued, with reasons therefore. . . . The judge to whom such recommendations are submitted shall, if he approve such recommendations,
enter a written order with such exceptions as the judge may deem proper,
by subscribing his name to each such list when corrected to conform to his
conclusions upon such recommendations. One of each such lists shall thereafter be filed permanently of record in such court.
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this act. There are no direct words in the statute that an opportunity for an
agency hearing shall be afforded the petitioner, but the section specifies that "The
record of the preliminary examination authorized by this subsection shall be admissible as evidence in any final hearing conducted by a naturalization court . . .
(emphasis added)."1 A court might interpret the statutory section as requiring an
opportunity for an agency hearing."2 From the regulations of the INS for the
conduct of these preliminary examinations, it is evident that the Service felt that
opportunity for a hearing is required by the statute.93 Exceptions one "4 and
five9P5 in the introduction of section 5 of the APA should remove the investigations
of the INS from the adjudicative procedure of the act. The reasons are: first,
a subsequent section - section 336 in the Immigration and Nationality Act provides for a final hearing in a court of law upon petitions for naturalization.
Subsection (b) of section 336 further provides that
The requirement of subsection (a) of this section for the examination of
the petitioner and the witnesses under oath before the court and in the presence of the court shall not apply in any case where an employee designated
under Section 335(b) of this title has conducted the preliminary examination authorized by section 335(b) of this title, except that the court may,
in its discretion, and shall, upon demand of the petitioner, require the examination of the petitioner and the witnesses under oath before the court
and in the presence of the court. (Emphasis added.)

In other words, the preliminary examination carries full weight in the court of law
only if the petitioner doesn't demand a trial, but even then the judge can accept
the report or reject it at his discretion. It does seem from the cases that courts
have given much weight to the findings of fact by the INS and their recommendations.97 But, in September, 1958, a United States District Court hearing a petition for naturalization accepted the report of the INS although some findings were
passed on hearsay evidence. The court held that the petitioner by the above subsection (b) was entitled to disprove the facts by a demand for a trial de novo
before it."' The reason that this investigation is not under section 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act is in accord with the reason that Congress permitted exception
one, that is, that "whatever judgment the agency makes is effective only in a prima
facie sense at most and the party aggrieved is entitled to complete judicial retrial
and decision."99
(7) The Atomic Energy Commission
The Atomic Energy Commission was established by the Atomic Energy
91 66 Stat. 255 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1958).
92 See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950). In this case, the Supreme
Court held that the deportation investigations, which resulted in the INS adjudication on the
deportable status of particular immigrants, were impliedly required by statute to give persons
an opportunity for a hearing. By the liberal construction of the deportation statute, the Supreme Court brought these deportation proceedings under the formal adjudication of the
APA. However, the naturalization preliminary examination is probably not an adjudicative
function on the part of the INS because naturalization is a "privilege" rather than a "right."
See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
93 8 C.F.R. § 335.11(a) & (b) (1958).
(The Commission rules require ruling on the
admissibility of evidence, cross-examination, and written evidence).
94 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004 (1958). "(1) any matter subject to a subsequent
trial of the law and the facts de novo in any court .... "
95 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004 (1958). "...
(5) cases in which an agency is
acting as an agent for a court .... )

96 66 Stat. 257 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) (1958).
97 See In re Hansen, 148 F. Supp. 187 (D. Minn. 1957) (District Court granted petition
for naturalization upon facts of examiner, but against examiner's recommendations; no full
hearing); Krausse v. United States, 194 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1952). (Naturalization did not
examine witnesses under oath and denied petition; Court of Appeals reversed on facts of examiner sdibmitted).
98 Petition for Naturalization of Grete W -- , 164 F. Supp. 659, 662 (E.D. Pa. 1958).
99 S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 23, at 260-61.
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Act of 1946,100 which was completely amended in 1954.101 The AEC's functions
are built around two purposes: development, use, and control of atomic energy for
the advancement of the welfare of society; and development, use, and control of
atomic energy for common defense and security.10 2 Among the many activities of
the ABC, only one purely investigatory function is apparent:
After any nuclear incident which will probably require payments by the
United States under this section, the Commission shall make a survey of the
causes and extent of damage which shall forthwith be reported to the Joint
Committee, and, except as forbidden by the provisions of Chapter 12 of this
Act or any other law or Executive order, all final findings shall be made
103
available to the public, to the parties involved, and to the courts ...
This investigation does not seem to fall under the definition of rule-making in the
Administrative Procedure Act, so it falls under the residual definition of adjudica-

tion. Of course, the statute says nothing about requiring an opportunity for an
agency hearing or a record, so the adjudicative procedure of sections 5, 7 and 8 of

the act will not logically be applicable. However, this report of the causes and
extent of damages is made available to the courts. Since this section was added
to the Atomic Energy Act in 1957, there are no cases demonstrating the AEC's
interpretation of their authority under this section. However, Congress must have
felt that the courts could use the data collected in such reports in resulting claim
litigation. Of course, the information in the trial would be no more than some

evidence which either party could attack. Congress gave no more weight to the
report than that the AEC make the report available to the courts. Congress did
not require the ABC to give parties an opportunity for a hearing; Congress intended
only that the procedure for the investigation should be at the discretion of the
AEC.' T In the Senate Report on the act, the reasons for the investigation are
given.
This survey is an aid to the Congress in establishing the causes of a nuclear
incident. It is in part, an aid to the parties in any action where it is unlikely that the public would be able to
obtain the full amount of technical
information which might be required. 105
So Congress anticipated the gathering of information by the AEC which was not
obtainable by private parties and so excluded formal hearings.

(8) The Federal Aviation Agency
In August of 1958, Congress created the Federal Aviation Agency4 ° 6 as an independent group with power to regulate air commerce and to regulate both civil and
military operations in the navigable airspace of the United States.' Under the Title
VII of the Federal Aviation Act, the Civil Aeronautics Board, not the FAA, is given
the duty of investigating civil aircraft accidents to determine the probable cause, to
ascertain what will best prevent such accidents in the future, and to make recommendations to the Administrator of the FAA as to what will tend to prevent similar accidents in the future. 08 One noteable feature of investigations by the Civil Aeronautics

100 60 Stat. 755 (1946).
101 68 Stat. 919 (1954), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-281 (Supp. V, 1958).
102 68 Stat. 921 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (Supp. V, 1958).
103 71 Stat. 576 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 2210(i) (Supp. V, 1958). (Chapter 12 which was
referred to in the quote is the chapter on Restricted Data).
104 See, United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, CIO v. Lilienthal, 84 F. Supp.
640 (D.C.1949).
105 S. REP'. No. 296, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1957).
106 72 Stat. 737 (1958), 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-542 (Supp. 1958).
107 72 Stat. 740 (1958), 49 U.S.C.A. § 1303 (Supp. 1958).
108 72 Stat. 781 (1958), 49 U.S.C.A. § 1441(a) (Supp. 1958).
(a) It shall be the duty of the Board to(1) Make rules and regulations governing notification and reporting
of accidents involving civil aircraft;
(2) Investigate such accidents and report the facts, conditions and
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Board is that the Board can request the FAA to investigate an aircraft accident
and report to the Board the facts, conditions, and circumstances thereof; then the
Board uses the report to determine the probable cause of the accident upon which
it makes a recommendation to the Administrator of the FAA.10 9 As a result of this
circuitous process, the original investigation by the FAA seems to result in rulemaking by it. However, since the Civil Aeronautics Board determines the cause
and makes the final recommendation, the cause determination results in the rulemaking. Congress intended "'that the Administrator or his representatives shall not
participate in the determination of probable cause by the Board under this subchapter."110 Because of this intermediate step by the Board, the original investigation by the FAA, as such, does not result in rule-making by the FAA because if
the Board determines that the probable cause is not within the control of the FAA
its recommendation will not result in the promulgation of a new rule by the FAA.
In many instances, the only result of the FAA's investigation will be a public report by the Civil Aeronautics Board. 1 1 Therefore, the investigation is a purely
investigatory function. This investigation by the FAA does not come within the
definition of rule and rule-making in the Administrative Procedure Act, so it falls
under the definition of adjudication and the procedure of sections 5, 7 and 8 of
the act. However, since the statute requires no opportunity for an agency hearing
and does not permit the reports of such investigations to be used in any suit or
action for damages growing out of the report, the exceptions of section 5 of the
Administrative Procedure Act remove the investigations from the adjudication
procedure.1 1 2 The Civil Aeronautics Board, in its rules for investigations under
Title VII of the Federal Aviation Act, agrees with this analysis. 13
III. DISTINCT INvESTIGATORY AGENCIES
(1) Presidential Board of Inquiry
Under the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act),

the President may, when a threatened or actual strike substantially affects an industry engaged in interstate commerce, thereby imperiling the national health
or safety,
...appoint a board of inquiry to inquire into the issues involved in the
dispute and to make a written report to him within such time as he shall
prescribe. Such report shall include a statement of the facts with respect
to the dispute, including each party's statement of its position but shall not
contain any recommendations .... .14

circumstances relating to each accident and the probable cause thereof;
(3) Make such recommendations to the Administrator as, in its opinion, will tend to prevent similar accidents in the future;
(4) Make such reports public in such form and manner as may be
deemed by it to be in the public interest....
109 72 Stat. 781 (1958), 49 U.S.C:A. § 1441(f) (Supp. 1958).
110 72 Stat. 781 (1958), 49 U.S.C.A. § 144 1(g) (Supp. 1958).
111 72 Stat. 781 (1958), 49 U.S.C.A. § 1441(a)(4) (Supp. 1958). ' (a) It shall be
the duty of the Board to ...
(4) Make such reports public in such form and manner as may be deemed by it to be
in the public interest. .. ."
112 72 Stat. 781 (1958), 49 U.S.O.A. § 1441(e) (Supp. 1958).
113 24 Fed. Reg. 2225-6 (1959), amending 14 C.F.R. § 303.2.
Aircraft accident hearings are held by the Board as a part of the investigation of accidents involving aircraft in order to determine the facts,
conditions, and circumstances relating to each accident and the probable
cause thereof and to ascertain measures which will best tend to prevent similar accidents in the future. It is purely a fact-finding procedure, and there
are no formal pleadings or issues and no adverse parties. During the course
of the hearing, no objections to any matter will be entertained from any
party to the investigation or any other person. Aircraft accident hearings
are not subject to the provisions of sections 4, 5, 7, 8 or 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act.
114 61 Stat. 155 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 176 (1952).
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Later,

. . the President shall reconvene the board of inquiry which has previously
reported with respect to the dispute. At the end of a sixty-day period (unless the dispute has been settled by that time), the board of inquiry shall
report to the President the current position of the parties and the efforts
which have been made for settlement, and shall include a statement by each
party of its position and a statement of the employer's last offer of settle-

*

ment. . ..

15

This Board of Inquiry is an agency within the definition of such in section 2 (a) of
the Administrative Procedure Act. Therefore, it falls within our problem since its
function is purely investigative, with no quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial action on
the part of the Board resulting from its investigation. This type of agency is last
dealt with because it is typical of federal agencies of a temporary, limited character
with one function only.
The above sections by which the President creates the Board of Inquiry do not
require the Board to make its report on the record after an opportunity for an
agency hearing. So the formal, adjudicative procedure of the Administrative
Procedure Act will not apply to its investigations. The cases on this do not indicate
any questioning of the different Boards' procedures used in the past." 6 Under
section 207(c), the Board is given the subpena powers, etc., which the Federal
Trade Commission has?-'7 The Board follows a procedure closely akin to the informal rule-making procedure of section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act.
The Board issues notices of its public investigations and permits interested persons
an opportunity to participate in the investigations."18 In fact, as the very words of
both sections in the Taft-Hartley Act indicate, the Board permits any party's statement of its position to be put in the report.
(2)
The Commission on Civil Rights
In September, 1957, Congress created, under the Civil Rights Act, the Commission on Civil Rights, whose life was to extend until November, 1959.12
The
life of the Commission has been extended for two more years by an act of Congress
in September, 1959.120
This agency is considered here for two reasons: first, it is
a typical investigatory agency of a temporary, limited character with no "quasi"
functions; and second, the Larche v. Hannah decision of October 7, 1959, recognized that the Commission's functions were purely investigatory and not under the
formal adjudication procedure, but still went on to require the Commission to give
subpenaed witnesses "the traditional rights" of confrontation and cross-examination
which are required in a formal judicial proceeding. 1 2 '
The investigative functions of the Civil Rights Commission are: to
(1) investigate allegations in writing under oath or affirmation that certain citizens of the United States are being deprived of their right to vote and have
that vote counted by reason of their color, race, religion, or national origin;
(2) study and collect information concerning legal developments constituting a
denial of equal protection of the laws under the Constitution; and
115 61 Stat. 155 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 179 (1952).
116 See, United States v. United Steelworkers of America, 202 F.2d 132, 135 (2d Cir.
1953); International United Mine Workers v. United States 177 F.2d 29, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
117 61 Stat. 155 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 177 (1952).
118 60 Stat. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1003(a), (b) (1958).
(a) General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the
Federal Register .

.

.

.

(b)

After notice required by this section, the

agency shall afford interested persons an opportunity to participate in the
rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with
or without opportunity to present the same orally in any manner ....
119 71 Stat. 635 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 1975c(b), (c) (Supp. V, 1958).
120 Pun. L. No. 383, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (Sept. 28, 1959). (Additional Appropriations for
Commission on Civil Rights, Title IV).
121 Larche v. Hannah, Civil No. 7479, W.D. La., Oct. 7, 1959.
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with respect to
(3) appraise the laws and policies of the Federal Government
2

equal protection of the laws under the Constitution.1
Under the APA definitions, exercise of these three functions do not result in agency
rule-making, so they fall under the residual definition of adjudication. By the
statute, a public hearing procedure with a record is set out in detail for these investigations.12 3 But whether or not this investigation of allegations of denial of civil
rights is required by statute to be made on record after an opportunity for an agency
hearing, the purely investigatory functions of the Commission would be exempted
from the adjudication procedure of the APA because any matter investigated would
be subject to a subsequent trial of the law and the facts de novo in any court. The
Commission can do nothing with its information except make reports to Congress.
It cannot prosecute. It can make no rules except those for the regulation of its
investigations.
Of interest is the fact that the Commission does not feel bound even by section
3 of the APA, 1 24 which requires publication by every agency of its rules of practice

in the Federal Register. 25

The Commission may interpret the statutory language,

122 71 Stat. 635 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 1975c(a), (b) Supp. V, 1958).
123 71 Stat. 634 (1957), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1975a(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h) (Supp.
V, 1958).
(a) The Chairman or one designated by him to act as Chairman at
a hearing of the Commission shall announce in an opening statement the
subject of the hearing.
(b) A copy of the Commission's rules shall be made available to the
witness before the Commission.
(c)
Witnesses at the hearings may be accompanied by their own
counsel for the purpose of advising them concerning their constitutional
rights.
(d) The Chairman or Acting Chairman may punish breaches of order
and decorum and unprofessional ethics on the part of counsel, by censure
and exclusion from the hearings.
(e)
If the Commission determines that evidence or testimony at any
hearing may tend to defame, degrade, or incriminate any person, it shall
(1) receive such evidence or testimony in executive session; (2) afford
such person an opportunity voluntarily to appear as a witness; and (3)
receive and dispose of requests from such person to subpena additional
.itnesses.
(f) Except as provided in sections 102 and 105(f) of this act, the
Chairman shall receive and the Commission shall dispose of requests to
subpena additional witnesses.
(g) No evidence or testimony taken in executive session may be released or used in public sessions without the consent of the Commission.
Whoever releases or uses in public without the consent of the Commission
evidence or testimony taken in executive session shall be fined not more
than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than 1 year.
(h) In the discretion of the Commission, witnesses may submit brief
and pertinent sworn statements in writing for inclusion in the record. The
Commission is the sole judge of the pertinency of testimony and evidence
adduced at its hearings.
124 The Federal Register, from 1957 to date, has not published any rules or regulations
of the 'Civil Rights Commission.
125 60 Stat. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (1958).
Section 3. Except to the extent that there is involved (1) any function
of the United States requiring secrecy in the public interest or (2) any
matter relating solely to the internal management of an agency - (a) Every
agency shall separately state and currently publish in the Federal Register
C1) descriptions of its central and field organization including delegations
by the agency of final authority and the established places at which, and
methods whereby, the public may secure information or make submittals
or requests;
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which only requires it to make its rules of procedure available to the witness when
he appears
before the Commission, to exempt it from the APA requirements of
1 26
notice.

In Larche v. Hannah, the voting registrars in a number of parishes in Louisiana
were subpenaed to appear before the Commission in July. The registrars asked to
know who their accusers were. The Commission refused to submit their names.
The registrars sued out an injunction to restrain the Commission from investigating.
The three-judge court held that this denial of the names plus the Commission's
regulation that only members of the Commission could examine witnesses 117 denied
the subpenaed witnesses traditional rights. The court has subjected this purely
investigatory function to a formal due process procedure, even though they impliedly
recognized the nature of the Commission's investigations. This seems rather inconsistent since the very reason that the Commission's proceedings did not come under
the formal adjudication of the APA was because nothing the Commission did had
a binding or legal effect on any individual or group. Any matter before the Commission was subject to a trial de novo.
Conclusion
In illustrating the purely investigatory functions of an administrative agency
by examples drawn from ten major agencies, it has been shown that these nonadjudicative, non-rule-making functions usually fall under the residual definition of
adjudication in the APA. And, due to the exceptions in section 5 of the act, these
purely investigatory functions are exempted from the formal procedures provided
by the APA. Therefore, it appears that the drafters of the APA have capably
excepted these investigations, which should not be brought under the more formalized procedure of adjudication. They have drafted the APA in 28such a way
that its "several sections and subordinate provisions are closely knit."'
This suggests that a literal interpretation, or strict construction, of the APA will
produce a desirable result. Although the literal interpretation of the APA would
seem sure to result in a formal procedure for non-adjudicative, non-rule-making
investigations, such is not the case. The approach utilized in this Note has demonstrated how the desirable result may be achieved. With each purely investigatory
function, this approach was to determine whether the investigations fell under the
definition of rule-making, which they did not, 129 and then to apply the exceptions
under section 5 of the APA. Either lack of a statutory requirement of an opportunity for an agency hearing or the subsequent requirement of a trial de novo were
the exceptions in section 5 of the APA which in every instance removed the purely
investigatory function from the formal procedure for adjudication under the APA.
If Congress required hearings in the particular statute, or there was the possibility
of such an interpretation by a court, Congress has in some instances specifically
excluded such provisions from the provisions of the APA. This was true of the
purely investigatory function of the FTC under the Defense Production Amendments
Act. Thus, these investigations are always released to the procedure of the individual agency which can best provide the specialized methods necessary for an
expert investigation.
of general policy or interpretations formulated and adopted by the agency
for the guidance of the public, but not rules addressed to and served upon
named persons in accordance with law. No person shall in any manner
be required to resort to organization or procedure not so published.
126 71 Stat. 634 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 1975a(b) Supp. V, 1958).
127 105 Cong. Rec. 17923 (daily ed. September 14, 1959). Rule 3(i) "Interrogation of
witnesses at hearings shall be conducted only by members of the Commission or by authorized
staff personnel."
128 S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 23, at 251.
129 There was one exception. The ICC valuations for the FCC fell under the definition
of rule-making, and then because the statute required an opportunity for an agency hearing
were subjected to the formal adjudicative procedure of sections 7 and 8 of the APA.

NOTES
Most of the purely investigatory functions drawn from the ten federal agencies
are, of course, not of a type easily subjected to formal adjudication. They usually
require the discretionary approach of an expert in order to illuminate obscure areas.
Of interest is the fact that each of the eight regulatory agencies examined have
0
Although such agencies
some non-adjudicative, non-rule-making investigations.3
are normally recognized to be bodies with extensive regulatory power in the fields
of trade, finance, transportation, and power, it is evident that their investigatory
activity is not restricted to their own use, but includes expert gathering of information for the public and for other bodies.
In general, it is submitted that the APA is not the imperfect and ambiguous
act it is often claimed to be. In the problem dealt with here, the APA, given a
literal interpretation, does not burden non-adjudicative, non-rule-making investigations with a formal procedure. However, the APA has been frowned upon by the
courts in its treatment of adjudicative functions of administrative agencies. In
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath,'31 the Supreme Court of the United States subjected
the adjudicative deportation proceedings of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service to the formal adjudication proceedings of the APA, reasoning that, although
the pertinent section of the Immigration Act did not explicitly require an opportunity for an agency hearing and so did not come under the adjudication procedure
of section 5, this exemption was applicable only to hearings held by regulation, rule,
custom or special dispensation, but not to those held by compulsion.' 2 Thus, the
courts have found that the APA exempts certain adjudicative functions-where
an individual's legal position and rights are affected- from the formal procedure
of adjudication. These they have felt should not be exempted, and, by statutory
construction as in the Wong case and by constitutional references to due process, 33
have subjected such adjudicative functions to the formal procedures of adjudication.
Now, in Larche v. Hannah, a court in effect has frowned upon the APA because it exempts the purely investigatory function of the Civil Rights Commission
from the formal adjudicative procedure. The three-judge federal court reached its
conclusion that the APA did not apply to the investigations of the Commission by
holding that such investigations, because neither adjudication nor rule-making, did
not come within the act. But failing to maintain a consistent position, the court
imposed a formal procedure upon such investigation, by the use of a due process
argument like those used in the cases imposing a formal judicial procedure on adjudicative functions. They did not reach their conclusion that the APA does not
apply by a literal interpretation of the APA. It is submitted that, had this been
done, the very exception which exempted the Commission would have weakened
their due process argument. The Commission has no power to prosecute and no
power to punish or even make rules. Its sole function is to investigate and report.
One who is investigated by the Civil Rights Commission is protected by a subsequent
130 But see, 105 Cong. Rec. 17923 (daily ed. September 14, 1959) Amicus curiae remarks
of Attorney General of Arkansas which were used for complainants in the Larche v. Hannah
case.

It is well to keep in mind that this Commission is greatly dissimilar
to the great body of regulatory agencies which possess investigatory powers.
These regulatory agencies investigate with a view to determining facts in
relation to violations, compliance, etc., with the law they administer. The
Civil Rights Commission investigates for the sake of investigation.

131 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
132 Id. at 50.
133 Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 502 (1959). The Supreme Court held that where
Congress or an Executive Order has not specifically exempted one from the traditional safeguards of due process, an agency of the government cannot fashion security programs whereby
persons are deprived of their present civilian employment and of the opportunity of continued
activity in their chosen professions without being accorded the chance to challenge effectively

the evidence and testimony upon which an adverse security determination might rest.
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trial de novo of both the law and the facts. This is the specific exception which
removed the Commission's investigations from the formal procedure of the APA.
This attack by the courts on the APA's exemption of purely investigatory
functions cannot in such an instance be based on constitutional grounds. The
rationale of the Wong case and others should not apply here. In Wong, the function
was adjudicative-a quasi-judicial activity-and the exception was a lack of a
statutory requirement for a hearing. In the Larche case, the function is purely
investigatory, affecting no one's life, liberty, or property, and the very exception
provides the only real safeguard to the individual. If the person investigated can
have a later trial de novo on the facts and the law, this would seem to provide
adequate compliance with the due process requirements of the fifth amendment. 13 4
Therefore, it is submitted that this attack on the APA by the court through its
constitutional interpretation and the resulting effect on the purely investigatory
functions of administrative agencies will have a deleterious effect on the usefulness
and reliability of the APA. Because of the failure of some courts to grasp the
import of a non-adjudicative, non-rule-making investigation, exemptions of such
from the APA can no longer guarantee that an agency "investigation for the sake
of investigation" will remain free from the formal and burdensome procedural
requirements of adjudication.
Thomas M. Clusserath

134 Larche v. Hannah, (Civil No. 7479, W.D. La., Oct. 7, 1959). Dissenting opinion
at 3 (mimeo.). "Without exception, the courts have drawn a distinction between investigative and adjudicative proceedings. Witnesses in investigative hearings do not have the
constitutional rights of a witness in an adjudicative hearing. The Fifth Amendment gives a
witness protection in an investigation; the opportunity to assert all due process rights in any
later adjudicative proceeding is a sufficient protection."

